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KYLE M. DRUDING† 
ABSTRACT 
  Recently, federal prosecutors’ increased interest in criminally 
charging foreign organizational defendants has revealed a 
“jurisdictional gap” in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 4, which has operated largely unchanged since its 
adoption in 1944, requires that a copy of a compulsory summons be 
served on an organizational defendant by mailing it either to the 
defendant’s “last known address” in the relevant district or to its 
“principal place of business elsewhere in the United States.” The 
courts have divided over how to confront jurisdictional challenges 
brought by certain foreign corporations—those without domestic 
principal places of business and addresses—that appear to be legally 
incapable of receiving service. As it stands, the jurisdictional gap 
threatens to effectively immunize large swaths of illegality over which 
the United States would otherwise have jurisdiction. The Department 
of Justice and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal 
Procedure have responded to this concern with dueling proposals to 
close Rule 4’s jurisdictional gap. 
  This Note agrees that the jurisdictional gap should be closed, but in 
a narrowly fashioned manner. Relaxing the service regime for foreign 
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organizational defendants too much may enable, for the first time, 
prosecutions of wholly extraterritorial conduct that would violate the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This Note sketches the 
contours of such a case, and concludes that any risk is best cabined by 
reasonably limited means of service under Rule 4 coupled with the 
responsible exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
INTRODUCTION 
America, in the assembly of nations, since her admission among 
them, has invariably, though often fruitlessly, held forth to them the 
hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous 
reciprocity . . . . But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to 
destroy.1 
An ongoing contract dispute involving alleged violations of 
intellectual property and trade secrets against an American 
corporation by a Chinese state-owned enterprise has evolved into an 
extraterritorial federal criminal prosecution, garnering serious 
political attention. AMSC, formerly American Superconductor, has 
accused the Beijing-based Sinovel Wind Group (Sinovel) of offering 
an AMSC employee an employment contract worth more than $1.5 
million in exchange for illegally procuring protected source code for 
the operation of wind turbines.2 The pirated software was then 
reimported for use in four wind turbines located mere miles from 
AMSC headquarters in Devens, Massachusetts, allegedly costing 
AMSC more than $1 billion and forcing it to shrink its worldwide 
staff by five-hundred employees.3 
Four civil suits based on this pirating were filed in China but 
stalled for years, and Chinese officials declined to prosecute.4 The 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) stepped in to indict Sinovel on 
charges of conspiracy, trade-secret violations, and wire fraud.5 
Secretary of State John Kerry, then the senior senator from 
 
 1. John Quincy Adams, Sec’y of State, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on 
Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821) (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/
detail/3484). 
 2. Press Release, AMSC, China’s Sinovel Indicted in the United States for Stealing 
AMSC Trade Secrets (June 27, 2013), available at http://ir.amsc.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID=774372. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Indictment at 4, 10, United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 3:13-cr-84 (W.D. Wis. filed 
June 27, 2013). 
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Massachusetts, characterized the controversy as “a mugging in broad 
daylight and a real test of China’s commitment to the rule of law.”6 
The Sinovel–AMSC incident, however, is not an isolated case. The 
U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that in 2009 alone, 
similar “muggings in broad daylight” by Chinese companies cost the 
U.S. economy $50 billion and 900,000 jobs.7 
Whatever the underlying merits of the DOJ’s charges in this 
case, an obscure procedural hurdle may prevent it and similar 
prosecutions from moving forward in federal court. Sinovel specially 
appeared to quash the government’s efforts to serve it process 
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 
4).8 For organizational defendants, Rule 4 requires the government to 
personally serve an officer or agent and to mail a copy of the 
summons to the defendant’s “last known address within the district” 
or “its principal place of business elsewhere in the United States.”9 In 
essence, Sinovel argued that its status as a foreign corporation, 
without a sufficient domestic footprint, immunized it from federal 
criminal proceedings because it was physically impossible for Sinovel 
to receive a copy of the summons pursuant to Rule 4’s current 
language.10 After reviewing the “underdeveloped law” and “facts that 
point in both directions,” Magistrate Judge Crocker issued a ruling 
that will allow the case to move forward, but noted that the “court 
could justify a ruling in either direction.”11 Highlighting its importance 
and complexity, Judge Crocker openly invited the appellate courts to 
provide guidance on this issue.12 Similar arguments in recent cases 
have likewise troubled other courts and vexed prosecutors’ efforts to 
vindicate U.S. interests by bringing criminal actions against foreign 
 
 6. Keith Johnson, Chinese Wind Turbine Maker Indicted in U.S.: Sinovel Charged With 
Stealing Trade-Secrets From American Firm, Copyright Infringement, WALL ST. J., June 28, 
2013, at B2. Vice President Joe Biden, Senator Elizabeth Warren, former Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, former U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, and former Acting Secretary of 
Commerce Rebecca Blank have also expressed their support for AMSC. Press Release, AMSC, 
supra note 2. 
 7. Johnson, supra note 6, at B2. 
 8. Brief for Defendant at 1, Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 3:13-cr-84. 
 9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C). 
 10. See Brief for Defendant at 13–17, Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 3:13-cr-84 (arguing that Rule 
4 precludes service on Sinovel). 
 11. United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 3:13-cr-84, at 1 (W.D. Wis. May 27, 2014) 
(order denying motion to quash service of process). 
 12. See id. (“Regardless which way this court rules on Sinovel China’s motion, the loser will 
appeal, perhaps generating some useful circuit case law on this point.”). 
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organizations.13 In response to the DOJ’s experiences, there are 
efforts currently pending to update Rule 4 to allow service to be made 
on foreign organizations whose conduct is subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction.14 
This Note is the first piece of scholarship to address the 
jurisdictional gap in Rule 4 and to analyze the courts’ mixed reactions 
to nonconforming attempts to effectuate service.15 It is also the first 
work to evaluate the recent movement to revise Rule 4. Further, this 
Note contributes to a developing body of scholarship on Fifth 
Amendment due-process limits in criminal prosecutions of 
extraterritorial conduct16 by assessing the unique challenges of 
prosecuting nonnatural persons. It also argues that potential due-
process concerns are best framed as policy concerns of general 
prosecutorial overreach, which cannot be adequately cabined by Rule 
4. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the jurisdictional gap embodied in the language of Rule 4 and 
examines the courts’ varied responses to defendants challenging the 
sufficiency of service of process. Part II details the DOJ’s and the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure’s (Advisory 
Committee’s) proposed revisions to Rule 4 and analyzes their subtle, 
but critical, differences.17 Part III explores the extraterritorial 
application of federal criminal law and its likely, but uncertain, 
limitations as a matter of Fifth Amendment due process. Part IV 
concludes that expanding service of process abroad will increase the 
likelihood that prosecutors will subject foreign organizational 
defendants to due-process violations; nevertheless, concerns about 
 
 13. See infra Part I.B.  
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. To this author’s knowledge, no one has previously examined this aspect of Rule 4, 
which may be due to its recent provenance. See infra note 39. Other analyses of Rule 4’s 
application to foreign defendants generally focus on its warrant provision for individuals. See, 
e.g., Thomas G. Becker, Justice on the Far Side of the World: The Continuing Problem of 
Misconduct by Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 18 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 292 (1995). 
 16. See infra note 172. 
 17. As of this Note’s publication, the Advisory Committee’s proposed changes to Rule 4 
have been submitted for public comment. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules 
of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure 329 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf. Comments 
may be submitted until Tuesday, February 17, 2015. Id. at 1. 
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potential prosecutorial overreach should not prevent efforts to update 
Rule 4 and to eliminate its jurisdictional gap. 
I.  RULE 4’S JURISDICTIONAL GAP 
As courts have repeatedly reminded prosecutors attempting to 
serve summonses on foreign organizational18 defendants like Sinovel, 
there is a jurisdictional gap between the substantive reach of federal 
criminal law and the procedural means used to enforce it. This Part 
examines the gap in Rule 4’s language and provides an overview of 
the judicial responses to nonconforming efforts to effectuate service 
on foreign organizational defendants. 
A. The Current Language of Rule 4 
Service of process in the U.S. legal tradition serves two primary 
functions: first, to provide notice of a pending action,19 and second, to 
establish the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant.20 These dual 
functions are incorporated into Rule 4, which governs arrest warrants 
and summonses in all federal criminal proceedings.21 Organizational 
defendants cannot be “arrested” in any meaningful sense,22 but are 
subject to compulsory summonses.23 Unlike the analogous provision 
governing civil proceedings,24 the Federal Rules of Criminal 
 
 18. Although this Note generally uses “organization” to refer to corporations, federal law 
defines the term broadly to encompass any “person other than an individual.” 18 U.S.C. § 18 
(2012).  
 19. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940) (holding that service must be 
“reasonably calculated to give [the party] actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to 
be heard” as a matter of due process). 
 20. See, e.g., Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) 
(“Service of process . . . is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”). 
 21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4. Similar issues may arise under state law, as well, because 
approximately half of the states have adopted similar or identical rules governing criminal 
procedure. Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 138 n.18 (1996) (identifying these states). However, state-law 
concerns may be less grave given the practical realities of prosecuting foreign organizations. 
 22. For a discussion of the fictive nature of corporate personhood encountered when 
serving foreign organizations and the associated policy concerns, see infra Part IV.A–B.  
 23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C). 
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(2) (enumerating several authorized methods of serving 
organizational parties outside a U.S. judicial district, including the use of an international 
agreement or court order). 
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Procedure do not specifically address defendants located abroad.25 
The relevant portion of Rule 4 is as follows: 
A summons is served on an organization by delivering a copy to an 
officer, to a managing or general agent, or to another agent 
appointed or legally authorized to return service of process. A copy 
must also be mailed to the organization’s last known address within 
the district or to its principal place of business elsewhere in the United 
States.26 
Thus, Rule 4 imposes two distinct requirements for properly 
serving summonses on organizational defendants: the delivery 
requirement and the mailing requirement, which are discussed in 
turn. 
1. The Delivery Requirement.  The requirement that a copy of the 
summons be delivered to an “officer,” “managing or general agent,” 
or “another agent appointed or legally authorized”27 is fairly 
straightforward and does not, on its own, create a jurisdictional gap. 
The delivery requirement does, however, raise the specter that 
prosecutors will be unable to serve an organizational defendant 
whose relevant agents are located abroad and where no federal 
statute authorizes an arrest to be made.28 
The problem of criminal activity committed beyond the reach of 
authorized U.S. jurisdiction is not limited to organizational 
defendants.29 What is unique to organizational defendants, however, 
is their ability to employ creative corporate structures as a shield 
against criminal liability for the parent company while maintaining a 
physical domestic presence. The most blatant version of such an 
attempted shield would be a foreign defendant incorporating a 
subsidiary in the United States for the sole purpose of engaging in 
 
 25. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C). Rule 4 also lacks a provision specifically addressing 
serving process on an individual abroad, but states that a summons may be served “within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere else a federal statute authorizes an arrest.” FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(2). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3)(C) (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2) (limiting the scope of service to locations within U.S. 
jurisdiction and those where federal statutes have authorized service). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 878–81, 895 (C.D. Ill. 2011) 
(finding that a Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Kuwait 
effectively precluded prosecution of the defendant for inflating bids submitted as a 
subcontractor to the U.S. government, even though the United States had jurisdiction over his 
conduct). 
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domestic criminal activity and insulating its legitimate business 
interests abroad. Under such circumstances, courts would likely hold 
the shell company to be the defendant’s “alter ego”30 or a “mere 
conduit for the activities of its parent,”31 and find service made on an 
agent of the shell company to be sufficient to establish jurisdiction 
over the defendant.32 When the relationship between parent and 
subsidiary is less stark, however, prosecutors face an onerous and 
highly fact-dependent burden of proof.33 
When the subsidiary’s operations are determined to be 
sufficiently distinct from its parent’s, service on the subsidiary will not 
be imputed to the parent.34 Therefore, foreign organizational 
defendants that maintain domestic corporate enterprises with a 
degree of separation in their activities are unlikely to be subject to 
service. As a result, although the delivery requirement may 
exacerbate such evasive measures,35 the service regime it creates for 
organizational defendants does not differ in kind from that faced by 
natural persons. 
2. The Mailing Requirement.  The requirement that a copy of the 
summons be mailed to an organizational defendant at its “last known 
address in the district” or “its principal place of business elsewhere in 
the United States”36 clearly contemplates a domestic mailing. 
Therefore, a “jurisdictional gap” exists when the United States has 
jurisdiction over an organization’s criminal conduct, but it is 
physically impossible to serve a summons on the defendant because 
the crime took place in a district where the defendant has no mailing 
address and the defendant maintains its principal place of business 
 
 30. United States v. The Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C., No. 1:09-cr-490, 2011 WL 1126333, 
at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2011). 
 31. United States v. Chitron Elecs. Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 298, 305 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 32. This approach—effectively, to pierce the corporate veil so that service on the subsidiary 
will bind the parent as well—is consonant with courts’ greater willingness to vindicate veil-
piercing challenges in statutory contexts to further governmental purposes. See 1 JAMES D. COX 
& THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 7:17 (3d ed. 2010) 
(discussing courts’ responses to veil-piercing arguments in contractual and statutory contexts). 
 33. See United States v. Alfred L. Wolff GMBH, No. 08-cr-417, 2011 WL 4471383, at *4–8 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011) (using a “totality of the circumstances” test to reject the government’s 
argument to “pierce the corporate veil” for purposes of service). 
 34. Id. 
 35. For discussion of a case that highlights the incentives to adopt similar parent–subsidiary 
structures as a shield against criminal liability in the United States, see infra notes 40–45 and 
accompanying text. 
 36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C). 
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abroad. The jurisdictional gap is especially pernicious for crimes 
committed remotely via the internet or through a domestic 
subsidiary,37 as failure to comply with the mailing requirement may 
stall U.S. prosecutions or even preclude them altogether.38 
Nor is this jurisdictional gap purely theoretical. Federal district 
courts have recently adjudicated several challenges from 
organizational defendants contesting the efficacy of service as a result 
of the government’s failure to satisfy Rule 4’s mailing requirement.39 
The DOJ’s experience in the first of these challenges highlights the 
mailing requirement’s potential threat as a procedural barrier to 
otherwise viable prosecutions. In United States v. Johnson Matthey 
PLC,40 the government indicted but twice failed to properly serve the 
defendant, an organization incorporated under the laws of England 
and Wales and with its principal place of business in London.41 Service 
was held to be improper despite the fact that the parties stipulated to 
an agent capable of receiving service.42 Moreover, copies of the 
summonses had been sent to the company’s main London office and 
to a subsidiary-owned refinery in Salt Lake City, Utah, via the 
subsidiary’s headquarters in Wayne, Pennsylvania.43 Despite having 
provided “ample notice,” prosecutors had failed to mail a copy of the 
summons in strict adherence to the language of Rule 4.44 
 
 37. See, e.g., Indictment at 4, 10, United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 3:13-cr-00084 
(W.D. Wis. filed June 27, 2013) (alleging that a Chinese state-owned enterprise conspired with a 
Serbian national employed by an Austrian subsidiary to steal protected information from a 
Massachusetts corporation’s internet server located in Middleton, Wisconsin). 
 38. Prosecutors could still pursue defendants in their individual capacities. However, 
specific consequences that flow from prosecutions of organizational defendants would be 
effectively barred by the text of Rule 4’s mailing requirement. See infra Part IV.B. 
 39. To date, seven district courts have ruled on Rule 4’s mailing requirement. United States 
v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Va. 2013); United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-cr-
3, 2012 WL 4788433 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2012); United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., 879 F. Supp. 2d 
1052 (N.D. Cal. 2012); United States v. Alfred L. Wolff GMBH, No. 08-cr-417, 2011 WL 
4471383 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011); United States v. The Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C., No. 1:09-
cr-490, 2011 WL 1126333 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2011); United States v. Chitron Elec. Co., 668 F. 
Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Johnson Matthey PLC, No. 2:06-cr-169, 2007 WL 
2254676 (D. Utah Aug. 2, 2007).  
 40. Johnson Matthey PLC, 2007 WL 2254676, at *1. 
 41. Id. at *1–2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at *2. Johnson Matthey PLC, which was not alleged to have had a presence in Utah, 
was charged with conspiracy and twenty-eight counts of regulatory offenses concerning effluent 
discharge at a gold and silver refinery owned by its subsidiary, Johnson Matthey, Inc. Id. at *1.  
 44. Id. at *2. 
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The court did suggest, however, that the government could have 
effectuated proper service through the bilateral Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty to which the United Kingdom and the United 
States are both signatories.45 Even if the court would have actually 
approved service pursuant to an international agreement—a method 
of service not apparent from a plain textual reading of Rule 446—
defendants located in countries not party to such an agreement would 
remain effectively immunized from prosecution. Thus, the court’s 
recognition of this jurisdictional gap would bar prosecution for at 
least a certain class of organizational defendants. 
From the limited available evidence, it appears that Rule 4’s 
jurisdictional gap is an unintended consequence of efforts to ensure 
actual notice for organizational defendants. Nothing in the Advisory 
Committee Notes (ACN) suggests that the jurisdictional gap created 
by the mailing provision was consciously intended. The only mention 
of the mailing requirement states that “in all cases in which a 
summons is being served on an organization, a copy of the summons 
must be mailed to the organization.”47 Although the ACN emphasize 
the importance of a mailing, they do not explain why the mailing must 
be a domestic one.48 Bolstering the view that the jurisdictional gap 
emerged inadvertently, the ACN explicitly state that Rule 4’s 
summons provisions were modeled on their counterparts in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.49 The analogous civil provision does 
not contain a domestic-mailing requirement and allows for service on 
organizations abroad in the same manner as for individuals.50 
If the drafters of Rule 4 had consciously intended to further a 
policy goal by enacting a domestic-mailing requirement, such as 
limiting the number of prosecutions brought against foreign 
organizations, evidence to this effect would be expected. Moreover, it 
is hard to imagine what policy rationales might have animated Rule 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Cf. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 287–90 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding 
service of process that occurred abroad pursuant to a multilateral treaty, but that was not 
independently authorized, to be insufficient). 
 47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 advisory committee’s note.  
 48. Id. 
 49. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(1) (“Any person authorized to serve a summons in a federal 
civil action may serve a summons.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 advisory committee’s note 
(“Service of summons under the rule is substantially the same as in civil actions.”). 
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h) (failing to specify that required mailings be made 
domestically).  
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4’s current mailing requirement. There is no compelling reason to 
believe that a domestic mailing could provide adequate notice, but an 
international one could not.51 Nor is there good reason to believe that 
foreign organizations lacking a domestic address or principal place of 
business should be immune from service, while those with such a 
domestic footprint are not.52 Therefore, the jurisdictional gap is most 
likely the unhappy oversight of a well-intentioned drafting effort. 
B. The Federal Courts’ Responses to Nonconforming Attempts at 
Service 
Courts encounter the horns of dilemma in prosecutions where it 
is impossible to make a domestic mailing on organizational 
defendants. On the one hand, service is an integral step in ensuring 
that courts act only within their own jurisdictional authority53—a 
failure to properly effectuate service will usually preclude a court 
from exercising its power over that defendant.54 On the other hand, 
courts should be concerned that the sensitive interests protected by 
federal criminal law may not be vindicated because of a provision 
that, in all likelihood, did not contemplate systematic 
underenforcement.55 
To date, the federal courts have generally hewed closely to the 
text of Rule 4 by granting motions to quash summonses where a 
domestic mailing to an organizational defendant could not have been 
made. The approach taken in United States v. Pangang Group. Co.56 is 
particularly instructive. The Pangang Group defendants, both foreign 
and domestic entities, consisted largely of state-owned enterprises of 
 
 51. In the civil context, for example, service may be made abroad by “using any form of 
mail that the clerk addresses and sends . . . that requires a signed receipt,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 
4(f)(2)(C)(ii), or pursuant to the Hague Convention, FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(f)(1). 
 52. Any possible rationale concerning the sufficiency of a U.S. nexus fails to explain why 
such a strong policy preference would be limited to the provision governing service of process. 
For a discussion of the due-process limits on U.S. prosecutions of noncitizens, see infra Part 
III.C. Moreover, the relevant portion of the ACN predates, by several years, the earliest case 
successfully challenging the validity of service as failing to satisfy the mailing requirement. 
 53. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (“Service of 
process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural 
imposition on a named defendant.”). 
 54. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“Before a 
federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement 
of service of summons must be satisfied.”). 
 55. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 56. United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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the People’s Republic of China.57 They were indicted on numerous 
charges, most prominently conspiracy to commit economic espionage 
and violation of trade secrets.58 The principal defendant held 
ownership interests in many of its codefendants, including a 75 
percent stake in Pan America, a New Jersey corporation.59 Over the 
defendant’s and its counsel’s objections, the government personally 
served Pan America’s general manager on behalf of the defendant 
and mailed copies of the summons to Pan America’s office in East 
Brunswick, New Jersey.60 
In response to the Pangang Group’s motion to quash the 
summons as improperly served, the court began with the “plain 
language” of Rule 4.61 The court differentiated Rule 4 from its civil 
counterpart, holding that a copy of the summons must be mailed to 
the organization directly—not to its general agent’s address—because 
Rule 4’s mailing requirement is “[un]ambiguous.”62 Next, the court 
noted that it was “relevant but not dispositive” that the Pangang 
Group had actual notice of the proceedings, and that effective service 
required “substantial compliance” with Rule 4’s stated 
requirements.63 Finally, the court concluded that a mailing to Pan 
America could properly effectuate service on the Pangang Group 
only if the government proved that Pan America was the “alter-ego” 
of the Pangang Group.64 This approach categorically fails to provide 
any means to serve foreign organizations if they lack a domestic 
 
 57. Id. at 1056. 
 58. See id. (describing the charges). 
 59. Id. The other 25 percent of Pan America was held by the Pangang Group’s “financing 
arm.” Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 1064. 
 62. Id. at 1065. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1066. Although the court did not hold that Pan America was the Pangang 
Group’s “alter-ego,” id. at 1069, there is good reason to believe that service would have been 
improper even if it had. Unless Pan America had a last known address in the Northern District 
of California, Rule 4 would require the mailing be sent to the defendant’s “principal place of 
business elsewhere in the United States.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C). Because the Pangang 
Group’s principal place of business is in China—not “elsewhere in the United States”—the 
court would have to determine that the Pangang Group had two principal places of business to 
uphold the mailing to Pan America’s New Jersey office, something of a metaphysical 
conundrum that runs counter to the logic of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in civil 
diversity cases. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (adopting a “nerve center” test 
to determine citizenship under which a party’s principal place of business must be located in “a 
single place”). 
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subsidiary or if the subsidiary operates as a separate, independent 
entity. 
Faced with the unfortunate results generated by strict adherence 
to the text of Rule 4, at least one court, the Eastern District of 
Virginia, has begun pushing back.65 Ruling on a situation in which a 
domestic mailing was physically impossible, Judge Liam O’Grady 
held that compliance with Rule 4’s delivery requirement alone 
provided effective jurisdiction over a defendant.66 The opinion noted 
that although the mailing requirement was “unambiguous[]” and 
“mandatory,” it was a statutory requirement, created wholly by Rule 
4, which did not preclude jurisdiction.67 In dictum, Judge O’Grady 
strongly suggested that courts could still hear cases where the mailing 
requirement had not been satisfied by imposing an “appropriate [but 
unspecified] penalty.”68 Reflecting on Rule 4’s jurisdictional gap, 
Judge O’Grady captured the intractability of a pure textualist 
reading: “It is doubtful that Congress would stamp with approval a 
procedural rule permitting a foreign corporate defendant to 
intentionally violate the laws of this country, yet evade the 
jurisdiction of United States’ courts by purposefully failing to 
establish an address here.”69 After failing to find to a “legal and 
factual certainty” that the government could not properly effectuate 
service, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.70 
In United States v. Kolon Industries, Inc.,71 the Eastern District of 
Virginia took the additional step of carving an exception out of Rule 
4’s mailing requirement. The court noted that it was “clear” the 
 
 65. It is unsurprising that the Eastern District of Virginia is pushing back, given that its 
efficiency in hearing complex commercial cases requires it to deal frequently with similar cases. 
Requiring prosecutors to comply with Rule 4 too strictly would conflict with the desire to 
dispose of cases in a timely manner and maintain the court’s “fabled rocket docket.” Eastern 
District of Virginia: The Rocket Docket, WILEY REIN LLP, http://www.wileyrein.com/
practices.cfm?sp=overview&id=57 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). For example, one prominent law 
firm has dubbed the Eastern District of Virginia the “most efficient court” in the United States 
and maintains a specialized “Rocket Docket Team” because of the advantages offered by the 
court’s unique expertise. Id. 
 66. United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-cr-3, 2012 WL 4788433, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 
2012). 
 67. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 68. Id. The court declined to “expound . . . the Rule’s syntax” to suggest what such a 
penalty might entail, but did hint that it may vary based on “the individual facts and 
circumstances.” Id. 
 69. Id. at *1 (footnote omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. United States v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Va. 2013). 
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prosecution “did not strictly comply with the mailing provision” and 
that doing so remained “impossible.”72 After employing a strict 
“textual reading” to determine that the mailing requirement was not 
jurisdictional in nature, the court invoked the “absurd consequences” 
canon73 to completely invalidate the mailing requirement in such 
circumstances.74 The court “decline[d] to construe [a] procedural rule 
to thwart the purpose of the substantive criminal statutes 
themselves,”75 denying that Congress could have intended to 
immunize wholly foreign corporate defendants from prosecution.76 
Kolon Industries remains the strongest indication of the federal 
courts’ uneasiness with Rule 4’s jurisdictional gap.77 
The federal courts’ growing dissatisfaction with the jurisdictional 
gap created by the mailing requirement reflects Rule 4’s underlying 
drafting problems. Although the courts have expressed at least some 
willingness to moderate the mailing requirement’s harshest 
consequences, the responsibility of eliminating the jurisdictional gap 
ultimately rests with Congress.78 
II.  THE DOJ’S ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE JURISDICTIONAL GAP AND 
REVISE RULE 4 
More than thirty years ago, V. Rock Grundman observed that 
“the United States has had three major exports: rock music, blue 
jeans, and United States law.”79 The resonance of this observation has 
 
 72. Id. at 800. 
 73. For an overview of how the “absurd consequences” doctrine functions in determining 
statutory meaning, see generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387 (2003). 
 74. Kolon Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. at 801. 
 75. Id. at 802. 
 76. Id. 
 77. In at least one other situation, a federal court has held that a summons may be 
delivered through an email to a foreign terrorist group’s website and through publication in 
several newspapers and magazines, considering such efforts to be “reasonably calculated to 
notify” the defendant. United States v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, No. 
1:04-cr-232 (D.D.C. July 19, 2005). The court did not mention Rule 4’s mailing requirement, 
however. See id. 
 78. There are several reasons to think that prospective drafting efforts can more 
appropriately address the current jurisdictional gap, including the legislature’s institutionally 
superior fact-finding, the benefits of uniformity, and separation-of-powers principles. See 
generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS 
ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 22–27 (2012). 
 79. V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United 
States Law, 14 INT’L LAW. 257, 257 (1980).  
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only intensified in the intervening decades. The overseas application 
of white-collar criminal law has been a major development.80 For 
example, between 1991 and 1999, the category of foreign firms 
prosecuted for antitrust violations ballooned from less than 1 percent 
to roughly 50 percent of all cases brought by the DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division.81 Tellingly, a defense lawyer, observing the effects on the 
U.S. Attorney’s Manhattan Office, remarked: “It’s no longer the 
Southern District of New York. It should be the Southern District of 
the World.”82 Resolving the jurisdictional gap created by Rule 4 will 
only become more urgent as globalization and economic development 
continue to extend the reach of foreign organizations. 
This Part discusses the DOJ’s proposal to reform Rule 4 and the 
Advisory Committee subcommittee’s revised version of the original 
proposal. Assuming that the government will continue to prosecute 
foreign organizations engaged in criminal conduct, there are strong 
arguments for removing the current procedural barriers in Rule 4. 
Updating Rule 4 in an excessively broad manner may create its own 
risks, however. Thus, it is important to ensure that the DOJ’s effort to 
eliminate the jurisdictional gap does not prove to be stronger 
medicine than the disease. 
A. The DOJ’s Original Proposal 
On October 25, 2012, the DOJ sent the Advisory Committee a 
recommendation (the 2012 Recommendation) to revise Rule 4.83 
Motivated by the fear that foreign organizations could “avoid liability 
through the simple expedient[]” of creatively structuring their 
domestic operations to avoid maintaining a permanent U.S. address, 
the 2012 Recommendation suggested two specific changes: 
eliminating the mailing requirement and creating a new mechanism 
 
 80. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1777 
(2011) (“In the past, domestic prosecutions of foreign corporations were not particularly 
noteworthy. . . . All of this has changed. Federal prosecutors now advertise how they target 
foreign corporations.”); Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White 
Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325, 326 (1997) (discussing the “international flavor” of the 
increased growth in U.S. prosecutions for white-collar offenses). 
 81. Garrett, supra note 80, at 1819. 
 82. Benjamin Weiser, For Prosecutor in New York, A Global Beat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
2011, at Al. 
 83. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the 
Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules (Oct. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Criminal/CR2013-
04.pdf. 
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for serving summonses on organizations abroad.84 As the 2012 
Recommendation observed, “[t]he environment that influenced the 
original drafters of the [r]ules . . . no longer exists.”85 
Increasing economic globalization and the prevalence of 
electronic communication create a daunting “new reality” for federal 
prosecutors: more than ever, foreign organizations may “conduct 
both real and virtual activities” in the United States without 
maintaining a physical presence there.86 Thus, foreign organizations 
now maintain “an undue advantage” over the government when it 
attempts to initiate criminal proceedings.87 The 2012 
Recommendation concluded that as long as the “core objective” of 
providing “notice of pending criminal proceedings” is fulfilled, the 
mailing requirement could be safely eliminated.88 
The 2012 Recommendation used the analogous civil provisions 
for serving process as a starting point.89 The civil rules include 
separate provisions for service made domestically90 and abroad.91 
These two civil provisions contemplate, but do not mandate, mailing 
copies of the summons to notify a defendant that legal proceedings 
have been initiated. The former provision requires mailing a copy of 
the summons when the statute authorizing an agent to receive service 
so provides.92 The latter provision allows service to be made through 
qualifying mailings, but does not require that a copy of the summons 
be mailed as a matter of course.93 Neither provision specifies a 
 
 84. Id. at 1. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale and Nancy King, Reporters, to the Members, 
Criminal Rules Advisory Comm., at 1 (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/
ca/rules041113.pdf. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 3 (“Because the original language of Criminal Rule 4 seems to have been 
based upon the parallel provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it may be useful to 
compare the current civil and criminal provisions.”).  
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1). 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(2). 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B). 
 93. Additionally, a copy of the summons may have to be mailed when service is made 
pursuant to an international agreement or foreign law that imposes a mailing requirement. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f), (h)(2) (allowing service to be made abroad on an organization in the same 
manner as an individual, which allows service to be made: (1) by international agreement 
“reasonably calculated to give notice”; (2) by a method prescribed by foreign law, by a foreign 
authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request, or by “using any form of mail that 
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particular address to which a mailing must be sent or restricts its 
destination to within U.S. borders.94 
The 2012 Recommendation recognized that the “greater public 
aims of criminal process” may require a “higher burden on the 
government” for effectuating service.95 It therefore rejected “direct 
incorporation” of the civil provisions.96 In order to satisfy this “higher 
burden,” the DOJ proposed a new subsection97 governing service on 
organizations abroad: 
(D) A summons is served on an organization at a place not within a 
judicial district of the United States: 
(i) by delivering a copy to an officer, to a managing or general 
agent, or to another agent appointed or legally authorized to 
receive service of process, in a manner authorized under the laws 
of the foreign jurisdiction where the officer or agent to be served 
is located, or 
(ii) by other means reasonably calculated to give notice, including 
(a) a stipulated means of service; 
(b) a means that a foreign authority undertakes in response 
to a letter rogatory or letter of request; 
(c) a means that a foreign authority undertakes in response 
to a request submitted under an applicable international 
agreement; 
(d) a means otherwise permitted under an applicable 
international agreement; 
 
the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt;” or (3) “by 
other means not prohibited by international agreement as the court orders”). 
 94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)–(2) (failing to specify an address or restrict mailings to a 
domestic address). 
 95. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 83, at 6. 
 96. Id. For example, the Hague Convention allows entry of judgments against parties that 
fail to appear after being served with a summons. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 
U.N.T.S. 163. Directly incorporating this provision (and others like it) into the criminal context 
would, needless to say, raise serious due-process concerns. 
 97. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 83, at 6. The new subsection would be 
titled Rule 4(c)(3)(D). Id. at 8. The DOJ’s proposal also includes the following changes: adding 
“A summons may also be served at a place not within a judicial district of the United States” to 
Rule 4(c)(2), striking the mailing requirement in Rule 4(c)(3), and adding “at a place within a 
judicial district of the United States” to Rule 4(c)(3) to create distinct provisions for domestic 
and foreign service. Id. at 7. 
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(e) other means upon request of an attorney for the 
government, as the court orders.98 
Proposed Rule (4)(c)(3)(D) creates two discrete mechanisms for 
serving process on a foreign organization. These methods hinge on 
whether personal service can be made on an agent of the defendant. 
Subsection (D)(i), which allows personal service to be made on 
an agent of the defendant pursuant to the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction’s law, generally tracks the language of the civil provision 
but differs in key respects. Most crucially, unlike the civil provision, 
Subsection (D)(i) contains no explicit requirement that service be 
made in a manner “reasonably calculated to give notice.”99 By 
omitting this requirement, the DOJ implicitly assumed that when 
personal service on an agent conforms to the laws of the relevant 
jurisdiction, proper notice is necessarily given. Although adherence to 
the foreign jurisdiction’s law may generally satisfy the “reasonably 
calculated” standard, employing service mechanisms available solely 
under a foreign sovereign’s law could raise serious concerns.100 Most 
notably, prosecutors may undertake foreign-service mechanisms that 
could not effectuate service domestically and that fail to provide 
actual notice, such as a law authorizing service to be made on a low-
level employee or a copy of the summons to be sent solely to a listed 
email address.101 
In contrast, Subsection (D)(ii), which creates five alternatives to 
personal service on one of the defendant’s agents, explicitly requires 
that these “other means” be “reasonably calculated to give notice.”102 
 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. (4)(f)(2). The “reasonably calculated” standard was enumerated in 
Mullane v. Century Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Mullane v. Cent. Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in 
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.” (emphasis added)). 
 100. Even absent legal barriers to using a service mechanism available only under the laws 
of a foreign sovereign, foreign-policy concerns may counsel against granting foreign citizens 
inferior procedural protections. For a discussion, see generally Paul B. Stephan III, 
Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of 
Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REV. 831 (1987). 
 101. Cf. Frederick S. Longer, Service of Process in China, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION 
2012 SECTION ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/litigation/materials/sac_2012/19-1_service_of_process_in_china.pdf (noting that 
requests to provide service on organizations in China must be submitted to the “Chinese 
Central Authority,” which has wide discretion to authorize various service mechanisms). 
 102. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 83, at 7. 
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Subsection (D)(ii)’s first four subparts are all premised on notions of 
consent. Subpart (D)(ii)(a), which allows service to be made by “a 
stipulated means of service,”103 guarantees that the defendant itself 
has consented to a specified means of receiving service and, by 
implication, to U.S. jurisdiction. Subparts (D)(ii)(b)–(d), which cover 
various international-service arrangements,104 require consensual 
agreements between the sovereigns with jurisdiction over the 
defendant and whose laws govern the defendant’s conduct. These 
methods are largely uncontroversial because they directly fulfill the 
dual purposes of service: providing notice and asserting jurisdiction.105 
Subpart (D)(ii)(e) creates a residual service provision that allows 
for any “other means . . . as the court orders,” if made “upon request 
of an attorney for the government.”106 This subpart lacks any element 
of consent; the United States may invoke it unilaterally as long as the 
prosecution and court act in tandem. This residual provision 
introduces the serious policy concern that an overzealous prosecutor 
and a rogue judge will together concoct inappropriate, undemocratic, 
and ad hoc methods of effectuating service, thereby infringing on 
other sovereigns’ jurisdiction and the defendant’s rights.107 This 
concern is somewhat less serious than it seems, however, because 
requests to invoke the residual service provision would likely be 
funneled through the DOJ’s Office of International Affairs, which 
provides some systemic oversight by working in conjunction with the 
State Department on matters concerning foreign relations.108 Still, 
such internal protections alone may be an insufficient check, and the 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The 2012 Recommendation notes that personal service may be provided by foreign 
governments themselves and is “the Department’s preferred method of service.” Id. at 8. 
 105. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 106. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 83, at 7. 
 107. In addition to the noteworthy diplomatic concerns, similar infringements of sovereignty 
may also violate international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 306 (6th ed. 2003) (“Persons may not be arrested, a summons may not be 
served, police or tax investigations may not be mounted, orders for production of documents 
may not be executed, on the territory of another state, except under the terms of a treaty or 
other consent given.”). 
 108. Office of International Affairs, THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/about/oia.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). The Office of 
International Affairs already has mandatory supervision over the process of making formal 
requests for international extradition and provisional arrests of fugitives. THE UNITED STATES 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-15.210 (1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.210.  
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residual service provision is the most contentious element of the 2012 
Recommendation. 
B. The Subcommittee’s Revised Version 
Our age will be known as the age of committees.109 
A subcommittee was appointed by the Advisory Committee to 
address the DOJ’s suggested changes to Rule 4.110 After a series of 
meetings in which it examined the proposed revisions, the 
subcommittee unanimously recommended that Rule 4 be amended.111 
It also recommended three specific changes to the 2012 
Recommendation.112 First, the subcommittee suggested eliminating 
the mailing requirement for all service made on organizational 
defendants in the United States unless an authorizing statute so 
requires.113 Second, the subcommittee proposed expanding the list of 
available methods to effectuate service on defendants outside a 
judicial district of the United States.114 Finally, the subcommittee also 
addressed a question not posed by the 2012 Recommendation: What 
happens when an organizational defendant has been properly served 
but fails to appear?115 
 
 109. M.P. SINGH, QUOTE UNQUOTE (A HANDBOOK OF QUOTATIONS) 85 (2005) (quoting 
the late British publisher Ernest Benn). 
 110. The subcommittee was comprised of prominent experts in the field, including law 
professors, judges, practitioners, and representatives from the DOJ. For a full list of the 
subcommittee’s members, see Draft Minutes, Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Criminal/CR2013-10.pdf. 
 111. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, Advisory Comm. on 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Members, Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. 1 (Sept. 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/
Criminal/CR2013-10.pdf. 
 112. The Subcommittee’s revisions were ultimately incorporated in the Advisory 
Committee’s proposal that is seeking public comment through February 17, 2015. See supra note 
17. 
 113. Id. at 2. 
 114. Id.  
 115. The subcommittee’s proposed answer to this question would allow a court to “take any 
action authorized by law if an organizational defendant fails to appear in response to a 
summons.” Id. at 1. The problem of an absentee defendant is not unique to Rule 4, and setting 
forth a complete solution falls far outside this Note’s scope. Courts possess several tools to deal 
with recalcitrant defendants, most notably the contempt power. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (2012) 
(granting each federal court the “power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both . . . 
[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command”). 
Courts may even be empowered to appoint counsel for absent defendants. See, e.g., United 
States v. Crosby, 24 F.R.D. 15, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (“It would be idle to provide for summoning 
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The most significant difference between the subcommittee’s 
proposed revision and the 2012 Recommendation is the list of options 
for making service outside a judicial district of the United States. 
Instead of five enumerated options under Rule 4(c)(3)(D)(ii), the 
subcommittee shortened the list to three.116 In addition to the change 
in form, the subcommittee also proposed substantial alterations to 
Rule 4(c)(3)(D)(ii)’s operative language. 
Table 1. Possible Revisions to Rule 4 
The DOJ’s 2012 Recommendation The Subcommittee’s Proposed 
Revisions 
 
(D) A summons is served on an organization at 
a place not within a judicial district of the 
United States: 
 
(i) by delivering a copy to an officer, to a 
managing or general agent, or to another agent 
appointed or legally authorized to receive 
service of process, in a manner authorized under 
the laws of the foreign jurisdiction where the 
officer or agent to be served is located, or 
 
(ii) by other means reasonably calculated to give 
notice, including 
(a) a stipulated means of service; 
(b) a means that a foreign authority 
undertakes in response to a letter rogatory or 
letter of request; 
(c) a means that a foreign authority 
undertakes in response to a request submitted 
under an applicable international agreement; 
(d) a means otherwise permitted under an 
applicable international agreement; 
(e) other means upon request of an 
attorney for the government, as the court orders. 
 
 
(D) A summons is served on an 
organization not within a judicial district 
of the United States: 
 
(i) by delivering a copy, in a manner 
authorized by the foreign jurisdiction’s 
law, to an officer, to a managing or general 
agent, or to another agent appointed or 
legally authorized to receive service of 
process; or 
 
(ii) by any other means that gives notice, 
including one: 
(a) that the parties stipulate to; 
(b) that a foreign authority 
undertakes in response to a letter 
rogatory, a letter of request, or a request 
submitted under an applicable 
international agreement; or 





The subcommittee’s first three methods of making service, 
detailed in Subparts 4(c)(3)(D)(i), (ii)(a), and (ii)(b), incorporate and 
 
a corporation if the court, after so doing, could not render judgment against it. The court must, 
therefore, have power to appoint one of its attorneys and officers to appear for the 
corporation.”).  
 116. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, supra note 111, at 130. 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). This version of the rule also includes purely stylistic changes. Id. 
at 9. 
DRUDING IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014 4:44 PM 
2014] IN SEARCH OF MONSTERS ABROAD 535 
consolidate the provisions in the 2012 Recommendation premised on 
consent.118 The subcommittee viewed these provisions as 
“uncontroversial” and unlikely to harm other rights under domestic 
or international law.119 
The subcommittee’s final proposed revision, Rule 
4(c)(3)(D)(ii)(c), could raise serious legal and policy issues. This 
catchall provision was included to “provide[] flexibility” when the 
other three provisions cannot be met, and operates similarly to the 
2012 Recommendation’s residual service provision.120 Notably, 
however, the subcommittee’s revision dropped the 2012 
Recommendation’s requirement that a court approve the alternative 
method of service by issuing a prospective order.121 Although the 
subcommittee’s revision generally tracked the language of the civil 
provision more closely than did the 2012 Recommendation,122 its 
abandonment of ex ante judicial approval for an alternative service 
mechanism deviates from the civil rules.123 Therefore, if adopted, this 
catchall provision allowing service to be made without court approval 
would seem to be unique in federal procedural law.  
Detractors could hypothesize a troubling situation in which 
service of a summons is made in a foreign country in contravention of 
that country’s laws and without its participation or consent. Further 
exacerbating the problem, the catchall provision may be invoked even 
when the government fails to show that it has exhausted Rule 4’s 
other options.124 As a result, prosecutors may freely elect to infringe 
on foreign sovereigns’ autonomy without prior judicial approval, 
whether or not less controversial means of effectuating service are 
available. According to the subcommittee’s survey of the civil 
 
 118. Id. at 6. For a discussion of the analogous provisions in the 2012 Recommendation, see 
supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 119. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, supra note 111, at 6. 
 120. Id. Compare id. at 130 (allowing service to be made “by any other means that gives 
notice, including one . . . that is not prohibited by an applicable international agreement”), with 
Memorandum from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 83, at 7 (allowing service to be made “by other 
means reasonably calculated to give notice, including . . . other means upon request of an 
attorney for the government, as the court orders”). 
 121. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, supra note 111, at 7. 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (allowing service to be made “by other means not prohibited 
by international agreement, as the court orders”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, supra note 111, at 6 n.8 (“The 
Subcommittee considered and rejected a[n exhaustion] requirement.”). 
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analogue, this potential consequence “appeared to have generated 
significant concern.”125 
The subcommittee omitted an ex ante-approval requirement for 
use of the catchall provision because it felt that courts should not 
impinge on the executive branch’s constitutional primacy in foreign 
relations.126 Under a service regime that does not require prior court 
approval, judges need not condone a violation of international or 
foreign law to establish U.S. jurisdiction over a given case.127 Instead, 
the “executive alone” will be responsible for determining whether the 
“public interest” warrants violating international or foreign law in a 
particular case.128 Although the subcommittee believed such cases 
would arise only “rare[ly],” the catchall provision affords the 
executive branch “the necessary flexibility” to act “in an efficient and 
effective manner”129—unilaterally, if need be. In contrast to the 2012 
Recommendation, the subcommittee placed the responsibility for 
invoking the catchall provision squarely on the executive’s 
shoulders.130 
Although the current jurisdictional gap in Rule 4 was likely 
created inadvertently,131 it may have conveniently excused the courts 
from grappling with the implications of the vast overseas expansion of 
federal criminal law in hard cases. Revising Rule 4 may force the 
courts to resolve several difficult questions obviated by the current 
jurisdictional gap. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW 
Service of process is only one requirement for properly 
commencing a prosecution against a foreign organization in the 
United States. Congress must have first passed a law criminalizing the 
defendant’s conduct pursuant to one of its enumerated powers. A 
court must also interpret that law to be fairly susceptible of 
 
 125. Id. at 7. 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. Id. at 7. 
 128. Id. at 8. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Entrusting this power to the executive’s discretion created its own tension. Several 
members “expressed support” for requiring individual prosecutors to receive prior approval 
from the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General in order to invoke the catchall 
provision. Id. at 9. Although such a requirement “might be desirable,” the Advisory Committee 
customarily declines to “dictate” internal DOJ policy. Id.  
 131. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
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extraterritorial application. Finally, the prosecution may not violate 
the defendant’s due-process rights.132 Part III provides an overview of 
the legal environment upon which a revised Rule 4 would be 
superimposed. It then highlights potential Fifth Amendment concerns 
raised by Rule 4’s revision. 
A. The Constitution’s Structural Limits 
As a matter of first principle, Congress may create federal crimes 
only if the Constitution expressly or impliedly empowers it to do so 
and if doing so would not violate another constitutional provision.133 
The Constitution does not categorically bar Congress from 
proscribing criminal conduct outside U.S. geographical boundaries, 
and several enumerated Article I powers specifically contemplate 
extraterritorial legislation.134 These powers include: the power to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,”135 the power to “coin 
Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin,”136 and the 
power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”137 When coupled 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause,138 courts have been willing to 
construe Congress’s authority to enact extraterritorial legislation very 
broadly.139 For example, the Foreign Commerce Clause, although 
distinct from its domestic counterparts,140 has been given a similarly 
expansive breadth.141 In short, the Constitution’s structure constrains 
 
 132. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Note expresses no view on what differences, if any, similar 
state prosecutions would face under a Fourteenth Amendment due-process analysis.  
 133. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.1 at 238 
(4th ed. 2011). 
 134. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2012).  
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding application 
of the Torture Act to the defendant’s use of torture in Liberia as a valid exercise of the treaty 
power and the Necessary and Proper Clause).  
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where, as in this 
appeal, the defendant travels in foreign commerce to a foreign country and offers to pay a child 
to engage in sex acts, his conduct falls under the broad umbrella of foreign commerce and 
consequently within congressional authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.”). But see 
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 907 n.24 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[Congress] is not empowered 
to regulate foreign commerce which has no connection to the United States. Unlike the states, 
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the extraterritorial activity Congress may proscribe, but this 
constraint’s exact limits remain nebulous.142 Thus, rather than 
claiming that Congress lacks the power to proscribe extraterritorial 
conduct, defendants challenging a prosecution will more likely 
succeed by arguing that their particular actions were not covered as a 
matter of statutory construction. 
B. The Role of International Law in Statutory Construction 
The judicial practice of statutory construction limits the reach of 
U.S. law over foreign defendants by creating a set of interpretive 
default rules. As a matter of domestic constitutional law, Congress is 
not bound by international law when it proscribes extraterritorial 
conduct.143 Whether or not international law itself is binding under 
U.S. law,144 it does play an important interpretive role. Congress may 
legislate to “supersede[]” a principle of international law when its 
intent is “clear” and the resulting conflict cannot be “fairly 
reconciled.”145 Congress can demonstrate its intent to proscribe 
extraterritorial conduct in a number of ways, such as by enacting laws 
specifically targeting foreign conduct or drafting extraterritoriality 
provisions that expressly delimit the scope of its legislation.146 Absent 
an explicit statement of a statute’s geographic scope, courts rely on 
 
foreign nations have never submitted to the sovereignty of the United States government nor 
ceded their regulatory powers to the United States.”). 
 142. See Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
337 (2001) (“[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear, the Foreign Commerce 
Clause is not limitless, . . . and . . . treaties may not extend to . . . citizens of non-party 
countries.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 144. International law in this context refers to customary international law. Agreements 
with other nations have the full force of federal law, as long as Congress has properly given 
them effect. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111 (1987). The extent to which customary international law is part of the law of the 
United States, and in what fashion, is a subject of much scholarly debate that this Note does not 
attempt to address. For a discussion, see generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, 
Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law 
Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815 (1997); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1555 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115(1)(a) (1987). 
 146. Podgor, supra note 80, at 329–35. 
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other techniques to resolve this “haziest” situation.147 Two canons of 
statutory construction function as default rules to address this 
potential uncertainty: the presumption against extraterritorial 
application and the Charming Betsy canon.148 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application.  The 
first relevant canon of statutory construction that limits the reach of 
U.S. law over foreign defendants is the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. The Supreme Court has recently restated 
the presumption: “‘[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.’”149 The presumption “serves 
to protect against unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those 
of other nations which could result in international discord.”150 
Foreign defendants accused of criminal conduct abroad may be able 
to invoke the presumption successfully when Congress has failed to 
address the governing statute’s scope.151 
Regardless of other expressions of Congressional intent, the very 
decision to proscribe certain categories of behavior will overcome the 
presumption against extraterritorial application because of the 
inherent nature of that conduct.152 In United States v. Bowman,153 the 
Supreme Court first announced its two-part test to determine 
whether particular conduct is of such a nature as to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. As Chief Justice Taft 
explained, “The necessary locus, when not specifically defined, 
depends on the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description 
and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the 
 
 147. Id. at 335. 
 148. For a discussion of the inconsistent ways in which these canons have been applied, see 
generally John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 
(2001). 
 149. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 150. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
 151. For a discussion of the likely, but yet uncertain, application of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application in the criminal context, see generally S. Nathan Williams, Note, The 
Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”: The Disparate Criminal–Civil Application of the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2014).  
 152. The range of proscribed conduct exempt from the presumption against extraterritorial 
application has led some commentators to advocate its revision or complete abolition. See Gary 
B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 
1 (1992) (arguing that the presumption is “obsolete” and “should be abandoned”); Knox, supra 
note 148, at 353 (arguing for a “clarified” version). 
 153. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
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power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law 
of nations.”154 Crimes such as espionage,155 theft of government 
property,156 and treason157—which are not “logically dependent on 
their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction”158—are considered so 
critical to national security that Congress is presumed to have 
proscribed qualifying conduct wherever it may occur. 
Under the Bowman framework, courts must attempt to distill the 
essential nature of a range of criminal offenses to determine whether 
the presumption against extraterritorial application is animated. As 
Professor Ellen Podgor observes, “Since Congress has often failed to 
focus on extraterritoriality in drafting statutes, courts are frequently 
left to consider the international ramifications of an extraterritorial 
application.”159 The cabining effects of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application will thus vary from case to case,160 but the 
presumption remains a viable shield for foreign defendants seeking to 
ward off uncertain U.S. jurisdiction. 
2. The Charming Betsy Canon.  The second canon of statutory 
construction that limits the scope of Congressional jurisdiction over 
foreign conduct is the Charming Betsy canon. This historically well-
rooted canon originates from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
 
 154. Id. at 97–98 (emphasis omitted). The modern restatement of the Bowman test requires 
that courts (1) “look to the text of the statute for an indication that Congress intended it to 
apply extraterritorially,” and (2) examine whether “extraterritorial jurisdiction comports with 
principles of international law.” United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421 (9th Cir. 2002). Under 
international law, states possess the jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce, all of 
which are subject to various substantive and procedural limits. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). 
 155. See United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197–98 (D. Mass. 1985) (“Because 
espionage is an offense threatening the national security of the United States, regardless of 
where it occurs, the Court readily concludes [its proscription] was meant to apply 
extraterritorially to citizens.”). 
 156. See United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973) (“It is inconceivable that 
Congress . . . would proscribe only the theft of government property located within the 
territorial boundaries of the nation.”). 
 157. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 930 (1st Cir. 1948) (“The nature of 
treason, therefore, is such that there is no a priori reason for supposing that the Congress would 
naturally be inclined to restrict [its] definition . . . within the territorial limits of the United 
States.”). 
 158. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
 159. Podgor, supra note 80, at 340. 
 160. At least one court has suggested that Bowman is distinguishable when the defendant is 
not a citizen of the United States. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,161 in which the court announced: 
“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law 
of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”162 The 
Charming Betsy canon counsels that, absent clear evidence to the 
contrary, Congress does not intend to disrupt the international legal 
order through domestic legislation.163 The canon operates primarily as 
a “braking mechanism” to limit the scope of federal law, but as with 
the presumption against extraterritorial application, its precise 
interpretative force remains “somewhat uncertain.”164 
The Charming Betsy canon may prove an effective shield for 
defendants whose prosecution would violate norms of customary 
international law, even when Congress clearly intended to grant 
extraterritorial application. In United States v. Ali,165 for example, the 
D.C. Circuit relied on the Charming Betsy canon to “check the 
exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction.”166 The court dismissed the 
relevant charge after finding that conspiracy to commit piracy was not 
a cognizable offense under international law.167 It specifically rejected 
the government’s argument that the general federal conspiracy 
statute168 evinced a sufficiently clear intent to overcome the canon’s 
protection.169 As Ali demonstrates, the Charming Betsy canon imbues 
U.S. law with the force of international law in the process of statutory 
interpretation that, like the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, constrains Congress’s power to proscribe conduct abroad. 
 
 161. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 162. Id. at 118. The Supreme Court had actually articulated a similar version of the 
Charming Betsy canon several years earlier. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 43 (1801) 
(“[T]he laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract 
the common principles and usages of nations.”). 
 163. With slight alteration in language, the Charming Betsy canon has been codified in the 
influential Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (1987). 
 164. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking 
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998); see id. at 490 (arguing 
that the Charming Betsy canon’s main thrust is interpretive, and that the canon “is best thought 
of today as a device to preserve the proper separation of powers between the three branches of 
the government”). 
 165. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 166. Id. at 935. 
 167. Id. at 936–42. The court did find, however, that aiding and abetting piracy was an 
offense recognized under international law and so upheld those charges. Id. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 169. Ali, 718 F.3d at 942. 
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C. Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Even when Congress possesses the enumerated power to 
proscribe extraterritorial conduct and displaces the interpretive 
default rules discussed above, defendants’ individually enforceable 
due-process rights may preclude U.S. prosecution. In their seminal 
article Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 
Professors Lea Brilmayer and Charles Norchi set out the first 
comprehensive treatment of the Constitution’s individual-rights 
protections against federal prosecutions of conduct occurring 
abroad.170 Brilmayer and Norchi argued that the “increasingly 
unilateral and aggressive character” of applying U.S. law 
extraterritorially could give rise to due-process challenges.171 While 
acknowledging that this trend raises sensitive policy concerns, they 
suggested that if courts “are to become involved, they must do so in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution.”172 Following the publication 
of their article, foreign defendants have continued to raise due-
process challenges frequently,173 even though no federal court has yet 
invalidated a prosecution on due-process grounds.174 The Supreme 
Court has not yet definitively ruled on this issue, and the circuits 
remain split over how to analyze due-process challenges between two 
divergent frameworks: the sufficient-nexus test and the fundamental-
fairness test. 
 
 170. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1261–62 (1992). 
 171. Id. at 1223.  
 172. Id. Brilmayer’s and Norchi’s work has generated extensive commentary offering 
competing conceptions of the Fifth Amendment’s protections for foreign defendants. See 
Anthony J. Coangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 124 (2007) (arguing for 
a due-process test that incorporates principles of international law); Mark Weisburd, Due 
Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 381 
(1997) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, places no 
territorial limits on Congressional legislative authority); see also Bradley, supra note 142, at 338 
(observing that “it may be logically awkward for a defendant to rely on what could be 
characterized as an extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution in an effort to block the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law”); Stephan, supra note 100, at 833 (“Although the 
Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the matter, it generally has indicated that overseas 
aliens enjoy no constitutional protection.”). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D.N.M. 2008) (citing 
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 170, at 1221 n.12). 
 174. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 
1223. One district court has found a violation of due process for an “arbitrary and 
fundamentally unfair” drug-conspiracy prosecution, but its ruling was reversed on appeal. 
United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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1. The Sufficient-Nexus Test.  The sufficient-nexus test requires 
that there be a minimum amount of contact between the defendant 
and the United States so that application of U.S. law is not “arbitrary 
or fundamentally unfair.”175 In applying this test, courts weigh “a wide 
range of factors” to determine whether a prosecution comports with 
due process.176 A sufficient-nexus requirement “serves the same 
purpose as the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction” by 
guaranteeing the court’s jurisdiction over “a defendant who should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this country.”177 Courts 
have construed this notice requirement very broadly by upholding 
prosecutions for conduct that put the defendant on notice of 
prosecution “somewhere” in the world, even if the defendant could 
not reasonably have anticipated being prosecuted in the United 
States.178 Three circuits have adopted the sufficient-nexus test: the 
Second,179 Fourth,180 and Ninth Circuits.181 
The best exposition of the sufficient-nexus test appears in United 
States v. Davis,182 which involved a prosecution under the Maritime 
Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The defendant, the captain 
of a ship ostensibly traveling from Hong Kong to the Caribbean via 
Mexico, was indicted after the Coast Guard discovered seven 
thousand pounds of marijuana during a maritime raid thirty-five miles 
from Point Reyes, California.183 Davis challenged U.S. jurisdiction 
 
 175. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 176. See United States v. Brehm, No. 1:11-cr-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 
2011) (noting that these factors include “(1) the defendant’s actual contacts with the United 
States, including his citizenship or residency; (2) the location of the acts allegedly giving rise to 
the alleged offense; (3) the intended effect a defendant’s conduct has on or within the United 
States; and (4) the impact on significant United States interests”), aff’d, 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
 177. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (quotation 
marks omitted). But see United States v. Perez Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding 
the use of civil personal-jurisdiction precedents in criminal cases to be “inapposite”). 
 178. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (finding 
that arms trafficking to terrorists in Spain and Central America created sufficient notice); see 
also United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 554 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the stabbing of a 
fellow contractor at a military base in Afghanistan created sufficient notice). 
 179. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 180. United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 181. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has 
abandoned its nexus requirement for prosecutions involving stateless vessels, however, relying 
instead on principles of international law. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 182. Davis, 905 F.2d at 245. 
 183. Id. at 247. 
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over his conduct as a matter of due process.184 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected his claim, finding that the evidence presented to the district 
court was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the sufficient-nexus 
approach.185 International law played a critical role in the court’s due-
process analysis.186 The court cautioned, however, that this inquiry 
into international law should not cause it to “lose sight of the ultimate 
question: would application of the statute to the defendant be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?”187 Although the court failed to 
incorporate international law as the test for due process, it did note 
that international-law principles “may be useful as a rough guide” to 
determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant 
and the United States.188 
International law provides five distinct bases of jurisdiction. The 
most significant source of jurisdiction is the “territorial principle,” 
which grants a state jurisdiction over its own territory.189 The 
territorial principle extends to conduct that has, or is intended to 
have, substantial domestic effects.190 Second, the “nationality 
principle” grants jurisdiction over a state’s citizens who commit 
offenses outside that state’s territory.191 Third, the “passive 
personality” principle grants jurisdiction over extraterritorial actions 
that affect a state’s nationals abroad.192 Fourth, the “protective 
principle” grants jurisdiction over conduct that threatens a state’s 
own security or the integrity of its governmental functioning, such as 
espionage or counterfeiting.193 Finally, a narrow band of crimes may 
be so widely condemned among the community of nations as to 
warrant “universal jurisdiction,” under which any state has the 
jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of these offenses.194 Offenses 
conferring universal jurisdiction include piracy; genocide; war crimes; 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 249. 
 186. In a footnote, the court mentioned that its previous decisions had discussed 
constitutional requirements “simultaneously” with principles of international law. Id. at 249 n.2. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1) cmt. c (1987). 
 190. Id. § 402(1)(c) cmt. b. 
 191. Id. § 402(2) cmt. e. 
 192. Id. § 402(2) cmt. g. 
 193. Id. § 402(3) cmt. f. 
 194. Id. § 404. 
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and, in certain instances, terrorism.195 These five bases of jurisdiction 
under international law implicate most potential U.S. interests in 
prosecuting extraterritorial conduct. Courts employing the “rough 
guide” of international law to define the limits of due process under 
the sufficient-nexus test will therefore find that the vast majority of 
factual scenarios fit under one or more of these jurisdictional bases 
(and thus satisfy due process).196 
2. The Fundamental-Fairness Test.  Some courts have adopted 
another standard to assess due-process challenges to prosecutions of 
extraterritorial conduct: the fundamental-fairness test. The 
fundamental-fairness test turns entirely on the “ultimate question” of 
the sufficient-nexus test—whether “application of the statute to the 
defendant [would] be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”197 The 
fundamental-fairness test’s rationale resembles the principle that “no 
man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could 
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”198 Courts have 
construed this notice principle quite loosely, suggesting that some 
criminal conduct may be so self-evidently illegal that its commission 
provides sufficient notice for defendants to be tried in the United 
States, no matter where the underlying conduct occurred.199 As with 
the sufficient-nexus test, courts often invoke principles of 
international law for guidance in assessing the fairness of a particular 
prosecution.200 Given the similarity of these two standards, perhaps 
the “difference [between them] is less real than apparent.”201 So far, 
 
 195. Id. § 404 cmt. b; id. § 404 Reporters’ Note 1. 
 196. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 170, at 1263 (predicting that “Fifth Amendment 
due process problems of federal extraterritoriality will be rare”). 
 197. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Davis, 
905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 198. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). 
 199. See United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011) (terrorism); United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1052 (3d Cir. 1993) (drug trafficking). 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375–76 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying on the 
“law of the flag” to uphold jurisdiction over a Maltese ship stopped in Venezuela); United 
States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding U.S. jurisdiction of drug-
trafficking offense under the “protective principle” because “all drug trafficking aboard vessels 
threatens our nation’s security”). 
 201. See United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728–29 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(“[T]he existence of a nexus is what makes the prosecution neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
unfair.”). 
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five circuits have, at least implicitly, adopted the fundamental-fairness 
approach: the First,202 Third,203 Fifth,204 Eleventh,205 and D.C. Circuits.206 
Like the sufficient-nexus approach, the fundamental-fairness test 
is unlikely to give rise to successful due-process challenges, as 
exemplified by the Ali case discussed above.207 Ali involved a Somali 
national who acted as a negotiator and interpreter in a hostage-taking 
incident in the Gulf of Aden.208 The victim of the hostage plot, the 
CEC Future, was a Danish-owned ship flying a Bahamian flag, 
carrying the cargo of a U.S. company.209 Only a “brief period of 
‘minutes’” occurred on the “high seas,” as the great bulk of the 
incident occurred in foreign territorial water.210 The defendant, also 
the “Director General of the Ministry of Education for the Republic 
of Somaliland” (a semiautonomous region of Somali), was indicted 
after flying into Washington, D.C., to attend an education conference 
in Raleigh, North Carolina, set up as a “ruse” by the government.211 
Ali’s extraordinary factual record underscores the occasionally 
tenuous connection between prosecutors’ charges and defendants’ 
connection to the United States.212 
 
 202. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. Judge Torruella, dissenting from a decision to not readdress 
the appropriate due-process standard en banc, found the lack of a sufficient-nexus requirement 
“suspect” because a federal prosecution lacking such a nexus would exceed the scope of 
Congress’s enumerated powers. United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 576 F.3d 59, 60–62 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting). Judge Torruella would have found “compliance with 
international law [to be] necessary but not sufficient” to satisfy due process. Id.  
 203. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1053. 
 204. United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259, 1266–67 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 205. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 206. See United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 943–46 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering any nexus 
requirement to be a proxy for determining whether a prosecution would be “arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair,” though not explicitly adopting the fundamental-fairness approach). 
 207. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 208. Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. Ali was originally arrested by Somaliland security forces after appearing in a 
documentary, STOLEN SEAS: TALES OF SOMALI PIRACY (Brainstorm Media 2012), before his 
invitation to and subsequent arrest in the United States. Shashank Bengali, U.S. ‘Overreaching’ 
in Piracy Case Against Somali, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-pirate-negotiator-20131106,0,3540136.story#axzz2ju6RC8r2. The Ali prosecution 
was not the first time federal prosecutors have generated serious due-process concerns by luring 
defendants to the United States. See United States v. Ayesh, 702 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(describing how prosecutors used the “pretext of attending a training seminar” to ensnare a 
Jordanian citizen suspected of stealing funds from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad).  
 212. In similar cases in which a defendant is only in the country “transitorily,” the 
Restatement suggests that courts would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate earlier conduct occurring 
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Despite this uncommonly weak connection to the United States, 
the Ali court ruled that the prosecution did not violate due process.213 
The court found that the International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages,214 whose implementing legislation formed the 
basis of the charges against the defendant, provided “global notice” 
sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Fifth Amendment, even 
though Somalia is not a signatory to the Convention.215 The court 
strongly suggested that, as long as the law is determined to apply 
extraterritorially as a matter of statutory construction, the Fifth 
Amendment does not impose additional limits on the extraterritorial 
application of federal criminal law.216 Under the Ali court’s logic, it is 
hard to imagine a prosecution of a natural person that would violate 
due process under either the sufficient-nexus test or the fundamental-
fairness test. If the relevant conduct fails to create jurisdiction, 
prosecutors are unlikely to spend their limited time and resources 
pursuing wholly foreign conduct that would not confer a jurisdictional 
basis under the “rough guide”217 of international law.218 
In contrast to prosecutions of natural persons, the aggressive 
pursuit of foreign organizational defendants may be more likely to 
run afoul of due process because the proscribed conduct will likely be 
limited to large-scale market offenses—mala prohibita rather than 
 
abroad. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 421(2)(a) (1987). Federal courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate may actually be broader than the 
Restatement suggests, however, given developments since the publication of its latest edition in 
1987. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held transient 
jurisdiction to be permissible, regardless of its reasonableness, because it was in line with 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” as understood (perhaps mistakenly) at 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 
604, 610–22 (1991).  
  At least one circuit has extended Burnham to apply to foreign persons in the same 
fashion as to U.S. nationals. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20–21 (2d 
Cir. 1998). But see Connecticut v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to 
extend Burnham to foreign defendants); Peter Hay, Comment, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially 
Over International Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 602–03 (1990) (“In an international context, an unqualified, 
unremitting rule of transient jurisdiction seems quite intolerable and is unfitting.”).  
 213. Ali, 718 F.3d at 946. 
 214. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature 17 Dec. 
1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205. 
 215. Id. at 944–45. 
 216. Id. at 946. 
 217. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 218. See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text. 
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mala in se219—which may fail to satisfy the notice requirement at the 
heart of Fifth Amendment due process.220 Part IV considers this 
possibility and its importance in the ongoing effort to revise Rule 4 to 
allow greater flexibility in serving summonses on foreign 
organizational defendants. 
IV.  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REVISING RULE 4 
Revising Rule 4 to eliminate its jurisdictional gap may give rise 
to new Fifth Amendment challenges, as cases that would have stalled 
or would have been dismissed for failure to properly effectuate 
service221 will come squarely before the federal courts. In addition to 
eliminating Rule 4’s jurisdictional gap, the 2012 Recommendation 
and the subcommittee’s proposed changes afford the government 
expanded powers to serve foreign organizational defendants. This 
expanded power itself may raise due-process concerns, in addition to 
facilitating prosecutorial overreach and threatening international 
comity. The efforts to revise Rule 4 also strike a new equilibrium 
between the judicial and executive branches in foreign affairs. 
This Note argues that, despite these concerns, the jurisdictional 
gap should be eliminated and Rule 4 revised accordingly because the 
application of federal criminal law should not turn on whether a 
domestic mailing could be made to organizational defendants. 
Although expanding the United States’ reach over foreign 
organizational defendants may increase the likelihood of due-process 
violations, the revision also implicates a logically prior concern—
prosecutorial overreach—that must be confronted directly in order to 
avoid potential abuses. 
A. The Exacerbation of Due-Process Concerns 
No court has yet addressed a foreign organizational defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment challenge to prosecution in the United States. The 
prospects for such a challenge remain unclear. The unique treatment 
 
 219. See Michael L. Tavers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1301, 1321 (1995) (“Unlike sanctions for violations of mala in se statutes, punishment 
for a malum prohibitum crime cannot be justified on the grounds that the defendant’s failure to 
know the law is in itself blameworthy.”). 
 220. Cf. Ratzlaf v. United States, 410 U.S. 135, 144, 149 (1994) (imposing an actual-
knowledge requirement because currency structuring is not “inevitably nefarious” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 221. United States v. Johnson Matthey PLC, No. 2:06-cr-169, 2007 WL 2254676, at *1 (D. 
Utah, Aug. 2, 2007).  
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of organizational entities under U.S. law may render the above due-
process analysis222 entirely inapposite. In the civil context, the 
Supreme Court has failed to generate a majority approach for 
determining the proper test for personal jurisdiction over 
organizational parties that enter the stream of international 
commerce.223 The Court has remained deadlocked, unable to strike a 
majority position that balances the sovereign “authority” over foreign 
organizations against the due-process protections parties enjoy as “a 
matter of individual liberty.”224 Given the sensitive public interests 
implicated in the criminal context, organizational defendants may 
simply lack many, if not all, due-process protections.225 
There is good reason to believe, however, that nonnatural 
defendants will be granted some level of due-process rights in this 
context, even if such rights are not coterminous with those of natural 
persons. In the wake of Citizens United v. FEC,226 the continued 
expansion of organizational entities’ constitutional rights beyond 
political spending seems likely.227 Prosecutions of organizational 
defendants can be analyzed similarly to those of natural defendants 
for purposes of jurisdiction and fairness because the question is 
ultimately one of federal authority vis-à-vis the defendant, not of the 
defendant’s organizational nature.228 Thus, these prosecutions do not 
raise many of the theoretical difficulties faced in other areas. 
Assuming that the courts will adopt organizational due-process 
standards similar to those for natural persons, this Note argues that 
aggressive extraterritorial application of federal criminal law to 
foreign organizational defendants could violate the Fifth Amendment 
under certain circumstances. At the outset, it is important to highlight 
 
 222. See supra Part III.C. 
 223. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (failing to garner a 
majority approach); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 580 U.S. 102 (1987) (same). 
 224. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 225. Moreover, whether and to what extent foreign defendants are permitted to exercise 
these constitutional rights remains an open question. For a discussion, see generally Stephan, 
supra note 100. 
 226. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 227. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010) 
(“Although much of the immediate reaction to Citizens United focused on the decision’s short-
term impact on political spending, the doctrinal impact of the decision is likely to be more 
significant.”). 
 228. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (“This Court’s precedents make clear that it is the 
defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to 
judgment.”). 
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these circumstances in order to understand the vision of U.S. law 
enforcement they imply. Regularly undertaking aggressive 
prosecutions that do not implicate substantial domestic interests 
would threaten to transform the U.S. Attorneys into the world’s beat 
cops. This vision of U.S. law enforcement is best imagined by slightly 
altering the facts of United States v. Nippon Paper Industries.229 In 
Nippon Paper, the First Circuit held that § 1 of the Sherman Act 
applied to a Japanese fax-paper manufacturer’s conspiracy with 
trading houses to artificially inflate the price of paper shipped to 
North America because of this extraterritorial trading scheme’s 
substantial and intended anticompetitive effects on U.S. markets.230 
Now imagine, instead, a prosecution in which the paper had 
remained exclusively in Japanese markets. Prosecuting this 
hypothetical antitrust violation, one consisting of wholly foreign 
conduct, would likely violate the manufacturer’s due-process rights 
under the framework for analyzing the extraterritorial application of 
federal criminal law.231 First, under conventional readings of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause,232 Congress has broad power to proscribe 
conduct that may affect global markets.233 Given the current realities 
of a globalized and interconnected world economy, inflated prices for 
fax paper purchased by Japanese companies could add to the costs of 
business in sundry international markets. Second, as a matter of 
statutory construction,234 the Sherman Act’s criminal provisions may 
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application 
because they might not be “logically dependent on their locality” 
under the Bowman framework.235 Indeed, this is the result the First 
Circuit reached in Nippon Paper.236 Unless prosecuting the 
anticompetitive behavior would run afoul of international-law 
principles, the Charming Betsy canon would not be implicated. 
Under a sufficient-nexus analysis,237 prosecuting a foreign 
defendant whose only connection to the United States is an 
 
 229. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 230. Id. at 2–3, 9. 
 231. See supra Part III. 
 232. See supra Part III.A. 
 233. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra Part III.B. 
 235. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
 236. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 237. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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attenuated chain of economic effects238 would likely violate due 
process unless there is a relevant jurisdictional basis under the “rough 
guide” of international law.239 The best candidate is the territoriality 
principle, which would apply if the potential Sherman Act violations 
had or were intended to have “substantial” domestic effects.240 
However, in the case of solely domestic activity with limited 
international impact, the United States would lack jurisdiction under 
the theory of “substantial effects.”241 The United States would lack 
universal jurisdiction242 and jurisdiction under the protective 
principle243 for a pure market offense. Without more evidence linking 
the putative criminal conduct to the United States, the prosecution 
would also lack a sufficient nexus. Moreover, the highly fact-
dependent and context-specific nature of a Sherman Act violation is 
insufficient to grant the “global notice” that acts of terrorism244 or 
large-scale drug smuggling245 inherently do. Notice would be 
particularly problematic if the foreign sovereign’s law lacked 
American-style antitrust prohibitions or if foreign regulators had 
previously approved the conduct in question.246 With this lack of 
meaningful notice, it would likely be “arbitrary” and “fundamentally 
 
 238. In this hypothetical prosecution, the costs of inflated paper purchases in Japan would 
only indirectly affect the United States through an aggregation of the steps of multiple 
international transactions originating from wholly foreign conduct. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that the Court would be “hard pressed to posit any activity . . . 
that Congress is without power to regulate” under a chain of inferences that would grant 
regulatory power over any behavior that would have cascading economic effects when all 
instances of that behavior are considered). 
 239. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 240. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 241. The Nippon Paper court’s reliance on the involvement of North American markets 
suggests that a higher quantum of conduct specifically targeting the United States is required to 
confer territorial jurisdiction over conduct occurring abroad. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 3–9 
(recognizing that although “civil antitrust actions predicated on wholly foreign conduct which 
has an intended and substantial effect in the United States come within Section One’s 
jurisdictional reach,” there may be reason to interpret the applicable language uniformly in 
criminal cases). 
 242. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 244. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 245. United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 246. In reality, the conduct in Nippon Paper violated both Japanese and U.S. law. Nippon 
Paper, 109 F.3d at 8. The specter that prosecutors may seek to apply criminal laws unique to the 
United States against foreign defendants engaged in conduct abroad that does not directly 
implicate U.S. interests is a stark reminder of the need to directly address the limits of 
prosecutorial discretion in the first instance, regardless of the potential due-process concerns. 
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unfair” to subject the company to prosecution. Accordingly, this 
prosecution would also fail a fundamental-fairness analysis.247 
Eliminating the jurisdictional gap to allow summonses to be 
served in situations where prosecutions would likely run afoul of 
foreign defendants’ due-process rights would exacerbate these 
concerns. This possibility should not stand in the way of revising Rule 
4, however. As a general matter, federal prosecutors can be expected 
to act judiciously when deciding to prosecute defendants who lack a 
physical domestic footprint.248 They are unlikely to expend valuable 
time and resources pursuing cases within the bailiwick of federal 
criminal law that do not substantially threaten domestic interests or 
may be better addressed by foreign sovereigns. It is possible that 
expanding prosecutors’ power would further enable, and perhaps 
even incent, the use of innovative tactics against foreign defendants.249 
To the extent that these due-process violations may occur, it is not the 
manner of service that is worrisome, but the underlying prosecution’s 
merits. The adoption of policies to rein in potential abuses of 
prosecutorial overreach should be engaged directly, not enforced 
furtively through procedural rules. 
B. Prosecutorial Overreach and International Comity 
The unique role that entity liability plays in the U.S. legal system 
provides prosecutors with powerful tools for dealing with foreign 
organizations. Although commentators have debated the merits of 
entity liability for decades,250 the modern practice of prosecuting 
 
 247. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 248. Although prosecutors have wide discretion to initiate or decline a prosecution, they 
should not bring charges if “no substantial Federal interest” would be served. THE UNITED 
STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 108, 9-27.220, 9-27.230. The United States Attorneys’ 
Manual makes clear that federal law-enforcement priorities are designed to be “effective 
nationwide” (not worldwide) and that these priorities are “national” (not global). Id. 9-27.230 
cmt. 1.  
 249. A powerful example is the so-called “Al Capone strategy,” whereby prosecutors 
successfully target savvy defendants by charging offenses that are easier to prove but do not 
fully vindicate the government’s underlying interests. Al Capone was eventually convicted on 
tax-evasion and Prohibition charges, not for the violent crimes (such as the St. Valentine’s Day 
Massacre) widely attributed to him. Famous Cases & Criminals: Al Capone, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/al-capone (last visited Nov. 
2, 2014).  
 250. There is a voluminous scholarly debate about the purposes of corporate criminal 
liability; this Note does not advocate any particular resolution. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532 (1996) (“[T]he 
circumstances in which substantially all of the traits of corporate criminal liability are socially 
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nonnatural persons has remained firmly rooted in the legal landscape 
for more than a century.251 The threat of criminal action will continue 
to remain a staple of the federal prosecutor’s playbook because of the 
many advantages it offers over the remedies available in civil suits, 
such as the threat of debarment from government contracting,252 and 
because of its uniquely expressive blaming function.253 In short, entity 
criminal liability offers a major stick for the United States to carry in 
its relations abroad. As the importance of post-Westphalian state 
borders continues to wane, the adoption of more aggressive 
enforcement strategies to harmonize international economic policy 
seems inevitable.254 The United States may have legitimate interests in 
using its criminal law as an element of foreign policy, rather than 
passively abiding future “mugging[s] in broad daylight.”255 One 
particularly fruitful strategy for prosecutors is the use of deferred 
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements as de facto 
regulations of extraterritorial conduct.256 Yet, the use of these 
agreements may be susceptible to serious abuse. This concern is 
particularly acute when the targeted defendants are state-owned 
 
desirable are nearly nonexistent.”); see generally, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: 
No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 
MICH. L. REV. 386 (1980) (describing the theoretical and practical difficulties with subjecting 
nonnatural persons to criminal liability).  
 251. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 486 (1909) 
(affirming Congress’s power to “enact laws which subject corporations to criminal prosecution 
and punishment”). 
 252. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1500–03 (2009) (arguing that the “critical real world importance” of 
collateral consequences “should not play a central role in debates concerning the proper scope 
of criminal liability”). 
 253. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
514 (2006) (describing the unique costs and “social meaning” of criminal sanctions). 
 254. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International 
Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 37, 37 (1990) (“Law enforcement, 
traditionally a domestic function of government, has become more internationalized. . . . These 
developments do not mark a passing phenomenon but rather the emergence of new and 
important dimensions to criminal justice, United States foreign policy, and international 
politics.”). 
 255. See Johnson, supra note 6, at B2. 
 256. See generally Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution 
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1863 (2005); F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A 
View from the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121 (2007), 
available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/warin.pdf. But see 
Garrett, supra note 80, at 1778–79 (demonstrating that foreign corporations are more likely than 
their domestic counterparts to plead guilty rather than enter into pre-indictment agreements 
with U.S. prosecutors). 
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enterprises. Subjecting organizations that are essentially extensions of 
foreign sovereigns to prosecution in U.S. courts is a heavy-handed 
approach, akin to a war power.257 
To the extent prosecutions of organizational defendants remain a 
practical reality, the fate of these prosecutions should not turn on the 
defendants’ nationality. Eliminating criminal liability for all foreign 
organizations would be a dramatic and unwarranted response to 
potential prosecutorial overreach, no less extreme than eliminating 
liability for all foreign natural persons. A regime maintaining criminal 
liability for domestic organizations, but not for their foreign 
counterparts, “would create perverse incentives for those who would 
use nefarious means to influence markets in the United States, 
rewarding them for erecting as many territorial firewalls as possible 
between cause and effect.”258 Rather, prosecutors must temper their 
reach abroad. 
The inherently fictive nature of nonnatural defendants poses 
several additional challenges in this context. Organizational 
defendants cannot be “arrested” in any meaningful sense, nor can 
they be “extradited.”259 Moreover, there is no criminal analogue to the 
Hague Convention, and extant bilateral and multilateral agreements 
do not specify mechanisms to compel a foreign organization’s 
presence in the United States in order to be prosecuted.260 Without 
the cooperation of a foreign sovereign, it remains unclear how 
prosecutors might outmaneuver recalcitrant defendants.261 Such 
unassisted prosecutions of foreign organizations may therefore prove 
unavailing. 
 
 257. In an analogous situation during the Founding period, the nascent U.S. government 
decided to deal with the Barbary pirates’ threats to global trade routes through military action, 
specifically rejecting an alternative crime bill. FREDERICK C. LEINER, THE END OF BARBARY 
TERROR: AMERICA’S 1815 WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES OF NORTH AFRICA 50–51 (2006). 
 258. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 259. Although individual officials may be arrested or extradited, doing so would not 
necessarily allow an organization to be prosecuted domestically. One barrier is the inability of 
an individual official to plead to the indictment at arraignment. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(a)(3) 
advisory committee’s note (“Read together, Rules 10 and 43 require the defendant to be 
physically present in court for the arraignment.”). 
 260. See generally Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar 
Crime: International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available To Address Them, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 209 (2002) (describing the limited and uneven procedural mechanisms used 
in international agreements to facilitate the prosecution of foreign defendants). 
 261. But see supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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This practical need for international cooperation bolsters the 
importance of tempered prosecutorial behavior underlying the 
doctrine of international comity. This doctrine suggests circumstances 
in which the laws of foreign sovereigns should be given deference, 
“having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and 
to the rights of [their] own citizens or of other persons who are under 
the protection of [their] laws.”262 In the sensitive realm of foreign 
relations, international comity may “counsel[] voluntary forbearance” 
when another sovereign has a “legitimate claim to jurisdiction” over 
the conduct.263 International comity is a nebulous doctrine whose legal 
force cannot cabin concerns of prosecutorial overreach on its own.264 
However, it remains a forceful reminder that the United States 
should sometimes defer to the autonomy of foreign sovereigns and 
the international legal order, in accordance with the concept of 
tempered prosecutorial discretion detailed above. 
C. Revision of Rule 4 and the Role of the Courts 
Rule 4 should be revised to eliminate the jurisdictional gap, but 
not all potential revisions are equally advisable. Successful efforts at 
revision must carefully balance the capacities and interests of the 
judicial and executive branches. The subcommittee’s proposed means 
of achieving this balance is its major point of departure from the 2012 
Recommendation.265 The 2012 Recommendation would require 
judicial authorization of an alternative means of service under the 
residual service provision,266 whereas the subcommittee’s version 
would not.267 At first blush, requiring court approval appears to serve 
as an ex ante check on unilateral prosecutorial actions dangerous to 
defendants’ due-process rights. 
This Note argues, however, that a regime of ex post review 
would better serve the institutional capacities of both prosecutors and 
courts, as well as decrease the likelihood of violating due process. 
There are four reasons to believe this is the case. First, a regime that 
 
 262. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 263. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8. 
 264. See id. (“Comity is more an aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a 
matter of obligation.”); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity”, 83 IOWA 
L. REV. 893, 896–97 (1998) (“[T]he phrase ‘comity’ leads not only to confusion but to 
disguise . . . .”). 
 265. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 266. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
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does not require prior court approval discourages the strategic 
behavior of locating an outlier judge who may be more amenable to 
expansive service proposals.268 Second, without judicial preapproval, 
prosecutors must internalize the full costs of deciding to bring suit in 
the first place, knowing that their actions will be subject to judicial 
review. Prosecutors would have to evaluate for themselves the 
likelihood of violating defendants’ due-process rights, rather than rely 
on a court’s preliminary, insufficiently informed decision to order 
service.269 A third benefit of granting prosecutors the exclusive power 
to select their preferred means of service as an initial matter is the 
method’s regard for the separation of powers—affording the 
executive flexibility when it engages in foreign relations, while 
retaining judicial oversight. Finally, organizational defendants may 
prefer ex post review because a judge would handle service as “a 
question of first impression,” rather than be forced to overrule her 
earlier decision.270 The subcommittee’s proposed revisions, which 
embrace these advantages of ex post judicial review,271 are therefore 
superior to the 2012 Recommendation. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no compelling theoretical or practical reason to allow 
the United States to serve summonses on foreign organizational 
defendants in criminal cases only if they maintain a domestic mailing 
address or principal place of business. Rule 4 should be revised to 
eliminate this jurisdictional gap. Revising Rule 4, however, may 
spawn potential due-process violations. Moreover, expanding the 
government’s ability to make service abroad may itself exacerbate 
due-process violations. 
This Note concludes that such concerns, while valid, are properly 
levied against the underlying decisions to bring extraterritorial 
 
 268. This would help curb our “national legal pastime” of forum-shopping in a category of 
prosecutions that, given the foreign defendants, could see its fair share of strategic behavior. J. 
Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 
317, 333 (1967). 
 269. This benefit is lessened to some degree by the fact that prosecutors may strategically 
serve defendants in an effort to induce settlements or other arrangements, regardless of any 
due-process concerns in later stages of a prosecution. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.  
 270. Memorandum from Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, Advisory Comm. on 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Members, Criminal Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 111, at 
9. 
 271. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
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prosecutions in the first place, not at the procedural mechanisms that 
govern them. As the United States continues to expand the 
application of its criminal laws abroad, it is critical for the DOJ to 
adopt a procedural framework that forces prosecutors to bear the full 
costs of their decisions when pursuing foreign organizational 
defendants. Undoubtedly, foreign organizational defendants will 
continue to act extraterritorially in ways that substantially affect 
domestic interests; such offending conduct may often justify a 
criminal response. But this class of offenses must be prudently culled 
to conserve American institutional legitimacy. Like their country, 
U.S. prosecutors must not go abroad “in search of monsters to 
destroy.”272 
 
 272. Adams, supra note 1. 
